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Within  a  non-cooperative  transboundary  pollution  game,  we inves-
tigate  the  impact  of the  adoption  of  a cleaner  technology  (i.e.,  a
decrease  in  the  emission  to output  ratio).  We  show  that  countries
may respond  by increasing  their emissions  resulting  in  an  increase
in  the  stock  of  pollution  that  may  be  detrimental  to  welfare.  It is
when  the  damage  and/or  the  initial  stock  of  pollution  are  relatively
large  and  when  the natural  rate of  decay  of  pollution  is  relatively
small  that  this  rebound  effect  of clean  technologies  is strongest.
Moreover,  these  results  are  shown  to arise  for  a  signiﬁcant  and
empirically  relevant  range  of  parameters  for  the  case  of  green-
house  gas  emissions.  Developing  clean  technologies  make  a global
agreement  over  the  control  of  emissions  all  the  more  urgent.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of clean technologies on levels of emission and welfare in the
presence of an accumulative transboundary pollutant.
In recent years, increasing attention is being paid by governments, international organizations and
academics to the creation and sharing of clean technologies. In the United States (US), this has taken the
form of new legislation. The “Investments for Manufacturing Progress and Clean Technology” (IMPACT)
Act of 2009, has been introduced to facilitate the development of domestic clean energy manufactur-
ing and production.2 International organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), are also actively
encouraging countries to fund the development of clean technologies. In 2009, the UN Environmental
Program urged countries to allocate one-third of the $2.5 trillion planned stimulus package (spent by
the developed world to boost the economy under the ﬁnancial crisis) for investing on ‘greening’ the
world economy. The G8 summit held in July 2009 included a commitment by the members to dou-
ble public investment in the research and development of climate-friendly technologies by 2015. The
agreement at the COP16 meeting held in Cancun in December 2010 includes a “Green Climate Fund,”
proposed to be worth $100 billion a year by 2020, to assist poorer countries in mitigating emissions,
partially by ﬁnancing investments in clean technologies (UNFCCC Press Release, 11 December 2010).
We investigate, analytically and through a numerical example using empirical evidence on green-
house gas (GHG) emissions, the impact of adopting cleaner technologies within a framework that
considers transboundary pollution emissions and where pollution emissions accumulate into a stock
and therefore have lasting repercussions on the environment,3 two essential features of the GHG emis-
sions’ problem. Considering a world made of n countries or regions, we  determine the non-cooperative
emissions policies of each region and determine the impact of having all countries simultaneously
adopt a cleaner technology (captured by a decrease in their emission to output ratio).
The adoption of a cleaner technology reduces the marginal cost of production (measured in terms
of pollution damages), thereby giving an incentive to each country to increase its production. We  show
that the increase in emissions associated with the increase in production can outweigh the positive
environmental impact of adopting a ‘cleaner’ technology. This is similar to the “rebound effect” found in
the literature on energy efﬁciency whereby energy savings are mitigated when efﬁciency is improved
(see, for example, Greening et al., 2000; Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2008). The beneﬁt of the extra
consumption from the adoption of the ‘clean’ technology can be outweighed by the loss in welfare
due to the increase in pollution. The positive shock of implementing a cleaner technology results in
a more ‘aggressive’ and ‘selﬁsh’ behavior of countries that exacerbates the efﬁciency loss due to the
presence of the pollution externality.
We  use the seminal transboundary pollution game model in Dockner and Long (1993) and Van der
Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992). In contrast with Van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) and Jørgensen and
Zaccour (2001), we have taken the ratio of emissions to output as exogenously given. This captures
situations where a cleaner technology is readily available in the more advanced country. Van der Ploeg
and de Zeeuw (1992) (Section 8) and Jørgensen and Zaccour (2001) consider the case where the ratio
of emissions to output is endogenous and is a decreasing function of the level of the stock of clean
technology. While Van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) assume that the stock of clean technology is
public knowledge, Jørgensen and Zaccour (2001) consider the case where the stock of clean technology,
also referred to as the stock of abatement capital, is country speciﬁc. Each country can invest in the
abatement capital in addition to its control of emissions.4 We  have opted to consider exogenously
2 The IMPACT Act will set up a two-year, $30 billion manufacturing revolving loan fund for small- and medium-sized man-
ufacturers to expand production of clean energy products. It was integrated into the Waxman–Markey Act (also known as the
American Clean Energy and Security Act) passed by the US House of Representatives in June 2009.
3 See Jørgensen et al. (2010) for a survey of dynamic game models used to analyze environmental problems.
4 Van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) compare the outcome under international policy coordination and the open loop
equilibrium when there is no coordination. They show that the level of production and the stock of clean technology are both
higher under the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Jørgensen and Zaccour (2001) consider an asymmetric game where there exist two  regions facing a pure downstream prob-
lem.  They design a transfer scheme that induces the cooperative levels of abatement and satisﬁes overall individual rationality
for  both regions.
H. Benchekroun, A. Ray Chaudhuri / Resource and Energy Economics 36 (2014) 601–619 603
given levels of ratios of emissions to output to focus on the existence and implementation of a new
technology only and abstract from the game of investment in technologies. While we  present the case
of exogenous changes in technology, the game we consider can be viewed as a second stage of a two
stage game where in an initial phase countries invest in their technologies. The cleaner technology can
be interpreted as an exogenous perturbation of the equilibrium technology choice from the initial stage
in investment in technologies. The fact that implementing a technology may  have counterintuitive
effects is even more striking in our setting, where the new technology is readily available and free.5
Our conclusions deﬁnitely suggest that incentives to invest in abatement technologies need to be
reevaluated in the face of non-cooperative emission strategies being implemented by countries.6
The main policy recommendation that can be taken from this analysis is that developing cleaner
technologies cannot be a substitute for the difﬁcult task of agreeing on and enforcing emission
restraints internationally.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 deﬁnes the Markov perfect equilibrium of the model that
we use. We  study analytically the impact of the adoption of a cleaner technology in Section 4 and
offer a numerical analysis based on empirical evidence of the model parameters in Section 5. Section
6 discusses the case where countries are asymmetric in terms of their technologies. Section 7 offers
concluding remarks.
2. The model
Consider n countries indexed by i = 1, . . .,  n. Each country produces a single consumption good, i.
Production generates pollution emissions.
Let εi denote country i’s emissions of pollution. We  have:
εi = ii (1)
where i is an exogenous parameter that represents country i’s ratio of emissions to output.7 The
implementation of a cleaner technology in country i is represented by a fall in i.
Emissions of pollution accumulate into a stock, P(t), according to the following transition equation:
P˙(t) = ni=1εi(t) − kP(t) (2)
with
P(0) = P0 (3)
where k > 0 represents the rate at which the stock of pollution decays naturally.
For notational convenience, the time argument, t, is generally omitted throughout the paper
although it is understood that all variables may  be time dependent.
The instantaneous net beneﬁts of country i = 1, . . .,  n are given by
Ui(i) − Di(P) (4)
with
Ui(i) = Ai −
B
2
2i , A, B > 0
5 Another paper to allow for exogenous technology changes within the context of a dynamic model of global warming is
Dutta and Radner (2006). Their model differs from ours in the following ways. They model pollution damage as being linear in
the  stock of pollution whereas we have a damage function that is strictly convex in the pollution stock. They model a cleaner
technology as a reduction in the ratio of emission to input of energy into the production process whereas we model a cleaner
technology as a reduction in the ratio of emission to output. They ﬁnd that a cleaner technology always increases equilibrium
welfare, in contrast to our main result.
6 We  note that there exists a related literature on the “green paradox”, where green policies are shown to possibly result in
an  overshooting of the stock of pollution (see, for example, Gerlagh, 2011; Hoel, 2011; Quentin Grafton et al., 2012; Van der
Ploeg and Withagen, 2012; Sinn, 2012). In the “green paradox” literature, this result arises due to the impact of such policies
on  the timing of extraction of a polluting exhaustible resource. The intuition driving the main result in this paper is different
since  it analyzes a renewable resource.
7 For n = 2 and 1 = 2 = 1, our model is equivalent to Dockner and Long (1993).
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and
Di(P) =
s
2
P2, s > 0. (5)
The objective of country i’s government is to choose a production strategy, Qi(t) (or equivalently a
pollution control strategy), that maximizes the discounted stream of net beneﬁts from consumption:
max
Qi
∫ ∞
0
e−rt(Ui(i(t)) − Di(P(t)))dt (6)
subject to the accumulation Eq. (2) and the initial condition (3). The discount rate, r, is assumed to be
constant and identical for all countries. We  deﬁne below a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this
n-player differential game.
3. The Markov perfect equilibrium
Countries use Markovian strategies: i(.) = Qi(P, .) with i = 1, . . .,  n. The n-tuple (Q ∗1 , . . ., Q
∗
n ) is a
Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium, MPNE, if for each i ∈ {1, . . .,  n}, {i(t)} = {Q ∗i (P(t), t)} is an optimal
control path of the problem (6) given that j(.) = Q ∗j (P, .) for j ∈ {1, . . .,  n}, j /= i.
In the following section, we analyze the case where countries are identical, that is 1 = · · · = n = .
In this case, such a game admits a unique linear equilibrium and a continuum of equilibria with non-
linear strategies (Dockner and Long, 1993). The linear equilibrium is globally deﬁned and, therefore,
qualiﬁes as a Markov perfect equilibrium. The non-linear equilibria are typically locally deﬁned, i.e.
over a subset of the state space. We  focus in this analysis on the linear strategies equilibrium. Since
our contribution is to highlight an a priori unintended outcome from the adoption of a “cleaner”
technology, we wish to make sure that our result is not driven by the fact that countries are using
highly “sophisticated” strategies.
Proposition 1. For P < P() ≡ (1/˛)(A − ˇ), the vector (Q, . . .,  Q)
Q ∗i (P; ) = Q (P; ) ≡
1
B
(A − ˇ − ˛P), i = 1, . . .,  n (7)
constitutes a Markov perfect linear equilibrium and discounted net welfare is given by
Wi(P; ) = −
1
2
˛P2 − ˇP − , i = 1, . . .,  n (8)
where
 ˛ =
√
B(B(2k + r)2 + (2n  − 1)4s2) − (2k  + r)B
2(2n − 1)2
 ˇ = An˛
B(k + r) + (2n  − 1)˛2
 = − (A − ˇ)(A − (2n  − 1)ˇ)
2Br
The steady state level of pollution
PSS() = n(A  − ˇ)
Bk + n˛2 > 0 (9)
is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof.  See appendix.
We note that Qi > 0 iff P < P(). It is straightforward to show that P() > PSS() for all  ≥ 0.
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4. Adoption of a cleaner technology
We  consider the case where 1 = · · · = n = . The implementation of a cleaner technology is captured
by a decrease in the emissions to output ratio, , and affects all countries. Throughout this section,
without loss of generality, we normalize B to 1.
The impact of a cleaner technology on equilibrium steady state pollution stock and equilibrium
emissions turns out to be ambiguous. More precisely:
Proposition 2. For any  > 0, there exists s > 0, k > 0, r > 0 and n≥1 such that we have
dPSS
d
< 0
if either s > s, k > k, r > r or n > n. That is, a decrease in the emissions to output ratio results in a larger
stock of pollution at the steady state.
Proof.  See appendix.
Note that this result may  hold for the case of n = 1 (i.e. the globally optimal solution) as well as for
the case where n > 1. The stock of pollution increases because countries’ emissions increase due to a
cleaner technology. This is because the cleaner technology reduces the damage from pollution at the
margin, providing countries with an incentive to emit more. Since this holds for all n ≥ 1, it follows
that a cleaner technology may  result in a larger pollution stock for all n ≥ 1.
Moreover, the greater the damage parameter, s, the greater the impact on countries’ emissions
through this channel. The greater is k or r, the less important the link between current emissions and
the stock of pollution. Hence countries emit more when k > k or r > r under the cleaner technology.
The greater the number of countries, the greater the free-riding incentive of each country within
this transboundary pollution game. Therefore, when faced with the cleaner technology, each country
increases its emissions more the larger is n.
Let E(P ; ) ≡ Q(P ; ), i.e. E(P ; ) denotes the emissions that are associated with the equilibrium
production strategy Q(P ; ). Proposition 2 establishes that the adoption of a cleaner technology results
in an increase of the long-run (the steady state) level of emissions. Indeed the impact of a decrease in
 on the steady state level of emissions can be obtained from the fact that nE(PSS() ; ) = kPSS() and
therefore, (dE(PSS() ; ))/d and (dPSS())/d have the same sign. The term (dE(PSS() ; )/d captures
the impact of a change in  on the steady state value of emissions and does not a priori inform us about
the impact of a change in  on the equilibrium path of emissions during the transition phase to the
steady state. We  now show that a decrease in  can result in an increase of the emissions throughout
the transition phase.
Proposition 3. There exists P˜ such that
E(P; ) ≤ (>)0 for all P≥(<)P˜
Moreover P˜ < P and P˜ > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
The adoption of a cleaner technology results in a decrease of emissions in the short-run only when
the stock of pollution is below a certain level P˜.  The results of Propositions 2 and 3 are illustrated in
Fig. 1 for a discrete change of  from ′ to ′′ < ′: there exists P˜′ such that for P > P˜′ , the adoption of
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Fig. 1. Emissions as a function of P as  changes from ′ to ′′ < ′ .
a clean technology results in a higher level of emissions in the short-run.8 When the damage caused
by the stock of pollution is large enough, a cleaner technology results in an increase of emissions in the
short-run as well as at the steady state (when P > P˜
′
), i.e. starting from P > P˜
′
the equilibrium path of
emissions when  = ′′ is, at each moment, above the equilibrium path of emissions when  = ′ > ′′.
Following the adoption of a cleaner technology each country increases its production. The resulting
increase in emissions outweighs the positive shock of a decrease in the emissions to output ratio
and can ultimately increase the stock of pollution. The welfare implications of adopting a cleaner
technology are thus not straightforward since the increase of production is associated with an increase
of pollution. We  show that implementing a cleaner technology may  end up reducing social welfare
(8), in each country: Wi(P ; ) may  be an increasing function of . From the optimality condition of a
best response of a single player we have from the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation associated to a
player’s problem
rW(P; ) = U(Q ) − D(P) + WP(P; )(nQ − kP)
The impact of a change in  is thus
rW(P; ) = (UQ (Q ) + nWP)Q + WP(nQ − kP) + nQWP
From the ﬁrst order conditions of the single player’s problem we  have
UQ (Q ) + WP = 0 (10)
8 This result is related to the “rebound effect” in the literature on energy efﬁciency policies, by which the decrease in energy
consumption caused by increased energy efﬁciency is mitigated due to behavioral responses. An extreme form of the “rebound
effect” may  result in an increase in energy consumption caused by increased energy efﬁciency, referred to in the literature as
the  “backﬁre effect”. We  note that Proposition 3 is similar to the backﬁre effect in that emissions are shown to increase in the
face a cleaner technology for a sufﬁciently large pollution stock.
The majority of empirical studies focus on changes in household consumption caused by the availability of more energy efﬁcient
products, such as fuel-efﬁcient cars, or more stringent energy policies. These studies typically ﬁnd that the rebound effect is
small.
By  contrast, our reduced-form framework captures both consumption and production sources of GHG emissions. According
to  Allan et al. (2007), energy savings policies in production sectors are likely to have stronger indirect and economy-wide
rebound effects than in consumption activities and depend crucially on energy substitution possibilities. The average household
may  also be more environmentally friendly relative to proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms. Also, Jenkins et al. (2011, 2013), and UK Energy
Research Centre Report (2007) discuss how multiple rebound effects operate at various scales, with the greatest magnitude at
the  macroeconomic, global scale relevant to climate change mitigation efforts.
The empirical evidence on the existence of the backﬁre effect is mixed. For example, Allan et al. (2007) and Gillingham et al.
(2013) do not ﬁnd evidence to support the backﬁre effect despite taking into account macroeconomic effects. According to the
UK Energy Research Centre Report (2007), the typical rebound levels range from 10 to 80%, which does not support the backﬁre
effect. Papers that do ﬁnd evidence in support of the backﬁre effect include Semboja (1994), Grepperud and Rasmussen (2004),
Glomsrod and Wei  (2005), Hanley et al. (2005), and Hanley et al. (2009).
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and thus
rW(P; ) = (n − 1)WPQ + WP(nQ − kP) + nQWP (11)
We  evaluate W at P = PSS()
rW |P=PSS() = (n − 1)WPQ + nQWP
which gives
rW |P=PSS() = (n − 1)(Q + Q )WP + QWP
or
rW |P=PSS() = (n − 1)EWP + QWP (12)
When production remains unchanged, for an inﬁnitesimal decrease in  there is a decrease of
emissions by Q which results in an increase of welfare since WP < 0. Thus, the second term of the
right hand side of rW |P=PSS() is negative and reﬂects the positive impact of a decrease in  due the
reduction of the country’s own  emissions if production is left unchanged. The ﬁrst term of the right
hand side reﬂects the impact on a country of the reaction of the other n − 1 countries to the change in
. If the decrease in  results in a decrease of emissions then the ﬁrst term is negative and the impact
of a clean technology on welfare is unambiguously positive. However, if E < 0, then the sign of W
can be positive or negative depending on the parameter values. We  show below that W may  well
be positive. The expression of W is too cumbersome to allow a determination of the sign of W for
all parameter values. In this section, we show analytically, in a limit case (i.e. when the damage from
pollution is large enough), that W is positive: a decrease of the emissions per output ratio reduces
welfare. In the next section, we investigate the sign of W numerically using plausible values of the
parameters and show that there exist a range of realistic values of the parameters under which W is
positive. We  would like to note that the sign of W(P) allows us to determine the impact of a (small)
change of  on welfare at a given stock of pollution. It incorporates the change in welfare throughout
the transition phase from an initial stock P to the steady state.
Proposition 4. (Main Proposition) For any n > 1, there exists s > 0 such that W |P=PSS() > 0 for all s > s.
Proof.  See appendix.
The positive shock of a cleaner technology results in a more “aggressive” or “voracious” behavior of
countries that exacerbates the efﬁciency loss due to the presence of the pollution externality. The
intuition behind this result is similar to the one behind the ‘voracity effect’ in Tornell and Lane (1999)
and Long and Sorger (2006), obtained in the context of growth under weak or absent property rights.
The main feature of the equilibrium that drives this ‘voracity’ effect is the fact that the non-cooperative
emissions strategies are downward sloping functions of the stock of pollution.9 Unlike static games
or dynamic games where countries would choose emissions paths, when Markovian strategies are
considered to construct a Nash equilibrium, a country can still inﬂuence its rival’s action path even
though it is taking its rival’s strategy as given. When the rival’s emission strategy is a downward sloping
function of the stock of pollution, the action of increasing one’s emissions bears an additional beneﬁt:
increase in one’s emissions would result ceteris paribus in a larger level of the stock of pollution
which would in turn induce one’s rival to reduce her emissions. This possibility to inﬂuence rival’s
emissions’ path results in an overall more polluted world than would prevail if each country takes
the rival’s actions as given. The response of each country to a positive shock such as a reduction of
the emissions to output ratio can be to expand its output. In this ‘aggressive’ setup, the extent of
9 This feature is related to the notion of intertemporal strategic substitutability at the steady state of the MPNE, used in Jun
and  Vives (2004) which provides a taxonomy for possible strategic interactions in continuous-time dynamic duopoly models.
Unlike the duopoly games covered in Jun and Vives (2004), in our model there is one state variable. Intertemporal strategic
substitutability at the steady state of the MPNE, corresponds to a situation where an increase in the state variable of one ﬁrm
decreases the action of its rival.
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the increase in output is such that the increase in pollution that follows and the damage it creates
outweigh the beneﬁts from the additional consumption.
Remark 1. The Main Proposition’s content mirrors the comparative static result in oligopoly theory
that an increase in ﬁrms’ costs may  end-up increasing ﬁrms’ proﬁts (see Seade, 1983; Dixit, 1986).
In our framework, countries’ instantaneous payoffs do not depend on each other’s ﬂows of emissions
directly; they are interrelated through the damage from the stock of pollution, a stock to which they
all contribute. A decrease of the emissions per output ratio is analogous to a decrease in the damage
from the production of a unit of output. However in our context, the dynamic dimension, an essential
feature of a climate change model, brings an additional level of interaction between players, compared
to a static or repeated game, that contributes to our result. Indeed, if one considers the simple case
of two countries and where the damage arises from the ﬂow of the sum of pollution (i.e., if the cost
of pollution were (1/2)s(E1 + E2)2 instead of (1/2)sP2), it can easily be shown that a decrease of the
emissions to output ratio is always welfare improving, for any arbitrarily large value of the damage
parameter s, in sharp contrast with the Main Proposition. One can possibly retrieve the perverse effect
of implementing a cleaner technology, present in the MPNE, in a static framework using a conjectural
variations approach. Dockner (1992) considered a dynamic oligopoly in the presence of adjustment
costs and has shown that any steady state subgame-perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game can
be viewed as a conjectural variations equilibrium of a corresponding static game.10 However, the
analysis of the full ﬂedged differential game allows us to ﬁrst capture the intertemporal nature of the
pollution game under consideration, and second, to take into account the transition dynamics when
determining the impact of a decrease in the emissions per output ratio.
Remark 2. We  note that the sign of W |P=PSS() is not, a priori, the same as the sign of dW(PSS())/d
which captures the impact of a change in  on the level of welfare at the steady state. For a small
discrete change of , the sign of dW(PSS())/d gives an indication of the comparison of two  welfare
levels evaluated at two different (steady state) stocks of pollution. When (dPSS()/d) < 0, we  have that
W |P=PSS() > 0 implies dW(PSS())/d = W |P=PSS() + W ′(PSS())(dPSS()/d) > 0 since W′(PSS()) < 0.
Remark 3. We  would like to emphasize that our Main Proposition is obtained when we have a
simultaneous decrease in all countries’ ′s. If, within this context, we considered a decrease in i only
while j, j /= i remain unchanged, then country i’s welfare would increase in response.11
5. Numerical example: climate change
The results derived in the previous sections gain relevance in the current context of climate change.
Can the development of clean technologies alleviate the consequences of failing to reach a global inter-
national agreement over GHG emissions?12 There is increasing support in the academic literature for
the view that innovative technology will play a central role to resolve the climate change predica-
ment. Barrett (2009) argues that to stabilize carbon concentration at levels that are compatible with
a long-run goal of an increase of the earth’s temperature by 2 ◦C with respect to the pre-industrial
era will require a ‘technological revolution’. Galiana and Green (2009) similarly predict that reducing
carbon emissions will require an energy-technology revolution and a global technology race.13
10 Dockner (1992) shows that, in the case of a differential game with linear demand and quadratic costs, that the dynamic
conjectures consistent with closed-loop steady state equilibria are negative, constant and symmetric.
11 Although not the focus of this paper, if we were to analyze the scenario where individual countries endogenously decide
whether to unilaterally invest in cleaner technology, taking the technology of the other countries as given, a given country
would undertake the investment as long as its beneﬁts of a decrease in i outweighed its private cost of reducing i . Within this
context, it is indeed possible that countries have an incentive to invest in a decrease in i if, for example, the cost of a reduction
in  i is a quadratic increasing function of the decrease in i and as long as country i’s marginal beneﬁt from a marginal decrease
in  i is positive. Papers that study investment in clean technologies with a stock pollutant include Fischer et al. (2004), Gerlagh
et  al. (2009), and Toman and Withagen (2000).
12 Large polluters, such as the US, remained outside the Kyoto Protocol. Efforts to reach a post-Kyoto agreement have been
disappointing thus far, as is evident from the outcomes of the UN Climate Conferences (for example, at recent UNFCCC COP
Meetings at Copenhagen (2009), Cancun (2010) and Doha (2012)).
13 Barrett (2006) argues that even treaties on the development of breakthrough technologies will typically share the same fate
as  treaties on emissions control since, unless technological breakthroughs exhibit increasing returns to scale. These treaties will
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In this section, we investigate the sign of W numerically, using ‘plausible’ values of the parameters
based on empirical evidence. We  also present the effect of non-marginal changes in the emissions per
output parameter on equilibrium welfare.
We  would like to emphasize the absence of consensus in the literature about precise values of
the parameters of the model. This is partly due to the large uncertainty surrounding the economic
repercussions of climate change. After a brief description of the ranges within which each parameter
may  fall, we start by presenting the impact of a change in the emissions per output ratio in a benchmark
case and then conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to parameter values.
The value of the discount rate is the subject of important debates: The Stern Review uses 1.4%,
Nordhaus uses 3–4%, others view discounting as unethical and argue that the rate of discount should be
nil (Heal, 2009). Most Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) (for example, the DICE model (Nordhaus,
1994), the RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996), the ENTICE model (Popp, 2003)) could have up to
20 regions but usually consider between 8 and 15 regions. Following Nordhaus (1994), Hoel and Karp
(2001) among others, we use the natural rate of decay k = 0.005.
As for the damage function, it is assumed that the damage is caused by the increase in CO2 con-
centration with respect to its the pre-industrial era: P measures the difference between the current
stock of CO2 and the pre-industrial level of stock of CO2, assumed to be 590GtC (see e.g., Athanassoglou
and Xepapadeas, 2012). The damage parameter is derived from estimates of the damage caused by
a doubling of the stock of GHG: P = 590GtC.  Let x denote the percentage of world GDP lost due to a
change in temperature if the stock of pollution doubles relative to the current level. We  have
x(WorldGDP) = nD(P)
Substituting for D(P), as given by (5), allows us to obtain s = 2(x(World GDP)/nP2).14 The value of x is
undoubtedly the subject of heated debates on the political and academic arena and is crucial to deﬁne
the extent and the pace at which climate change related policies need to be implemented. In a recent
study, Tol (2009) conducts the difﬁcult task of aggregating the results of 14 studies on climate change’s
economic repercussions and gives a relationship between the increase of temperature and the damage
using different scenarios. The upper bound of the 95% conﬁdence interval of x is approximately 10%
under the assumption that temperature would rise by 2.5 ◦C and 12.5% if the temperature increases by
3 ◦C.15 Based on experts’ opinions reported in Nordhaus (1994), Karp and Zhang (2012) use 21% as the
maximum value for x. As Tol (2009) points out, most of the studies do not give any estimation of x for
changes in temperature that exceed 3 ◦C, do not look at a time horizon beyond 2100 and their estimates
typically ignore important non-market impacts such as extreme climate scenarios, biodiversity loss
or political violence due to the increasing scarcity of resources induced by climate change. Taking into
account market and non-market impacts, Heal (2009) estimates that the cost could be 10% of world
income. Taking into account the risk of catastrophe, the Stern Review estimates the 95th percentile
to be 35.2% loss in global per-capita GDP by 2200. Thus, although for example the Stern Review uses
5% as an estimate of x, it considers it as a conservative estimate. We  will use 2.5% in the benchmark
case, and conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to x, using x = 5% and x = 10%.
We start by describing the benchmark case with the following parameter values, as summarized
by Table 1.
We  also present the results for x = 0.05 and x = 0.1, holding the other parameter values constant
at the benchmark levels. We  also allow k to vary from 0 to ∞,  holding the other parameter values
constant at the benchmark levels, and allow r to vary from 0 to ∞,  holding the other parameter values
constant at the benchmark levels.16
fail because of the incentive of countries to free ride. However Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010) show that this pessimistic outcome
can  be overturned if one takes into account that the adoption costs of a breakthough technology vary with the level of R&D.
They  show that a large coalition can be both stable and result in a signiﬁcant welfare improvement.
14 List and Mason (2001) and Karp and Zhang (2012) have used the same approach to derive the numerical value of the
pollution damage parameter. We note that this numerical simulation determines the impact of a reduction in  on the present
value  of GDP net of damages.
15 In Nordhaus (1994) the 95% conﬁdence interval of x is (− 30.0, 0) under the assumption that temperature rises by 3 ◦C.
16 Note that r refers to the social discount rate which includes the rate of time preference.
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Table 1
Parameter values.
Parameter Benchmark case
x 0.025
n 10
k 0.005
r  0.025
0
G
θ
3. 8315x10⁻⁴1.722x10⁻⁴
x = 2.5%
x = 10 %
x = 5%
Fig. 2. G at P = PSS(0) as a function of .
We  deﬁne the function
G(P, , 0) =
W(P; )| − W(P; )|=0
W(P; )|=0
which represents the relative change in welfare as  changes from 0 to  and the stock of pollution is
P.
In order to determine the value of 0 we use the following 2008 data. We  use $60,689.812 billion
as the value of the world GDP in 2008, as reported by the World Economic Outlook (2009) of the
International Monetary Fund. We  use 9.9 ± 0.9GtC as the value of total CO2 emission from fossil fuel
combustion and land use change in 2008, as reported by Le Quéré et al. (2009). We  use a short-term
decay rate of emissions of 36% (i.e. 64% of emissions adds to the stock in any given year), as reported
by Newell and Pizer (2003). Also, 3.67 represents the conversion rate from units of carbon to units of
CO2. Using these values, we obtain
0 =
(9900 × 109)(3.67)(0.64)
60689 × 109
= 3.831 5 × 10−4tCO2/$
We  plot in Fig. 2, G(PSS(0), , 0) where 0 is set to 0.38315 kg of CO2/$ of GDP.17
We  set B = 20 so that when  = 0 we retrieve the same speciﬁcation of the linear quadratic models
of transboundary pollution where instantaneous utility U is expressed in terms of emissions (e.g.,
Dockner and Long, 1993; Van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1992; List and Mason, 2001; Hoel and Karp,
2001).
We  can observe that a decrease of the emissions per output from 0 can result in a loss in wel-
fare: the welfare loss from the increase in pollution emissions outweighs the welfare gains from an
17 We  note that there is ongoing debate about the value of the short term decay rate. The value of 0 may  be higher, corre-
sponding to a lower short term decay rate in line with Archer (2005) and Le Quéré et al. (2009) who discuss that carbon sinks
are  shrinking.
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increase in consumption. Note that in Fig. 2, W(P; )|=0 < 0 and therefore when G(P, , 0) > 0 we
have W(P; )| − W(P; )|=0 < 0.
The benchmark case represents a relatively optimistic scenario in terms of the damage of pollution.
The sensitivity analysis that follows demonstrates that the consideration of less optimistic parameter
values strengthens the perverse effect that follows a reduction in the emissions per output ratio.
The emissions per output ratio has to decrease below ˜0 = 1.722 × 10−4tCO2/$ (i.e., a decrease of
54. 33%) for the decrease to be welfare enhancing. The threshold ˜0 falls to 1.0155× 10−4tCO2/$ (i.e.,
a decrease of 73.5%) when we use x = 5% and to 6.251×10−5tCO2/$ (i.e., a decrease of 83.68%) when
x = 10%.
We  plot W |P=PSS(0) as a function of x (Fig. 3).
x0
W θ |P = P  (θ )
0.5
0
SS
0.001
Fig. 3. W |P=PSS (0) as a function of x.
For the benchmark case, for all x> 0.1 % we have W |P=PSS(0) > 0. A marginal decrease in emissions
per output ratio reduces welfare. The relationship of W |P=PSS(0) with respect to x (which is a proxy
for s) mirrors the result obtained analytically for the behavior of W |P=PSS() in the limit case where
s→ ∞.  The larger the damage parameter, the more likely a decrease of the emissions per output ratio
will be welfare reducing.
Let Z ≡ P0/PSS(0). That is, Z is a parameter that sets the initial level of the stock of pollution relative
to the steady state stock of pollution. Fig. 4 shows that the graph of W |P=Z∗PSS(0) is a strictly increasing
function of Z.
W θ |P = Z * P   (θ )SS
Z0 0.263
0
0.231
x = 2.5 %
x = 10 %
Fig. 4. W |P=Z∗PSS (0) as a function of Z.
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Fig. 4 shows that W |P=Z∗PSS(0) is positive for Z > Z˜ = 0.263. The larger the stock of pollution at
which we introduce a cleaner technology the more likely this will result in a welfare loss. The value
of Z˜ decreases to 0.237 when x = 5% and to 0.231 when x = 10%.
Similarly, one can show that W |P=PSS(0) is a strictly decreasing function of k and is positive for
k < k˜  = 0.025. The smaller the rate of decay, the more likely the implementation of a clean technology
can reduce all players’ welfare. The threshold k˜  increases to 0.033 when x = 5% and to 0.039 when
x = 10%.
These results represent rather pessimistic conclusions about the ability of technology to alleviate
the tragedy of the commons, since it is when the damage is important and/or the stock of pollution is
large enough, and nature is least able to absorb pollution, that a decrease of the emissions per output
ratio is mitigated by the increase in pollution emissions of each player to the point where welfare
diminishes.
Moreover, it can be shown that W |P=PSS(0) > 0 for r > 0.00284. This is because the less forward-
looking each country, the more aggressive the behavior of each player in terms of their emission
strategies. Therefore, the higher is r, the greater the incentive of each country to increase emissions
when faced with a cleaner technology.18
This numerical example has demonstrated that the perverse effect of implementing a cleaner tech-
nology is not a mere theoretical possibility within the context of climate change. It is shown to be strong
for a signiﬁcant and empirically relevant range of parameters. It is when the damage is relatively large
and/or the initial stock of pollution are relatively large and when the natural rate of decay of pollution
is relatively ‘small’, i.e. precisely the situations where the tragedy of the commons is at its worse, that
the perverse effect prevails.
Moreover, a direct implication of the example is that a more rigorous pricing of carbon will not
only give the proper incentives to initiate a R&D race and the technology ‘revolution’ necessary to
control green house gas emissions, as argued, for instance, in Barrett (2009) and Galiana and Green
(2009), but it is also necessary to prevent the implementation of the innovations from exacerbating
the climate change problem.
6. Transfer of clean technologies
Consider now the case of an asymmetric pollution game where countries differ with respect to
their emissions per output ratios: we no longer assume that i = j for i, j = 1, . . .,  n. The analysis of
the previous sections can be reproduced. However, since the intuition of these results obtained in the
sections above carry over to this case, we refrain from doing so and just give the description of the
results.
For simplicity consider the case of two groups of countries: i = l with i = 1, . . .,  nC and i = h > l
with i = nC + 1, . . .,  n. Countries are identical in all respects except for the emissions per output ratios.
Clearly, if nC/n is small enough then, any transfer of clean technologies from the group of clean countries
to the group of dirty countries, captured by a decrease in h can lead to an increase of the dirty countries’
emissions and a smaller welfare worldwide.
This possibility can also be shown to arise by considering the limit case where: l = 0. In that case,
the group of clean countries cannot condition their action on the stock of pollution even though they
are impacted by it. Each clean country chooses to produce at a rate A. The objective of each of the
‘dirty’ countries’ governments is to choose a production strategy, Qi(t) (or equivalently a pollution
control strategy), that maximizes the discounted stream of net beneﬁts from consumption subject to
the accumulation equation
P˙(t) = ni=nC+1εi(t) − kP(t) (13)
and the initial condition (3).
18 We  note the role played by r depends on the value of 0. If, for example, we  use 4.7× 10−4tCO2/$, instead of
3.831  5×10−4tCO2/$, then it is possible that a marginally cleaner technology reduces equilibrium welfare only if r is sufﬁciently
low.  This is because the role of r is complex when Markovian strategies are considered.
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Clearly, if technology were fully transferable we would have a decrease of the dirty countries’
emissions per output ratio from h to 0 and therefore a transfer of technology results in a decrease of
emissions and an increase in all countries’ welfare. However, technologies are typically only partially
transferable and the case l = 0 is considered here only for an illustration.
Even though this is an asymmetric differential game, it is still analytically tractable and one can
follow identical steps used in the sections above to show that a decrease in h may  result in an increase
in emissions of pollution, therefore reducing the clean countries’ welfare. Moreover, if the increase
in emissions is large enough, this may  result in all countries’ welfare diminishing following a ‘partial’
transfer of clean technologies to the dirty countries.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper shows that the failure of coordination over emissions of transboundary pollutants may
prevent the international community from reaping any beneﬁt from the creation and adoption of a
cleaner technology and may  even result in exacerbating the tragedy of the commons.
The decrease of the emissions per output ratio has two  components, the direct effect which is a
decrease of emissions if the quantity produced by each player remains unchanged, and the indirect
effect since quantity produced changes and so do the emissions. Emissions may  increase following the
adoption of a cleaner technology, and the resulting increase in pollution damages can be substantial
enough to annihilate the positive impact of the direct effect on welfare. We  have shown that this may
arise for a wide range of ‘realistic’ values of the parameters of the model. Moreover, the possibility
that emissions per output ratio and world emissions can evolve in opposite directions is supported
by recent anecdotal evidence within the context of climate change. While the world’s emissions per
output ratio decreased from 0.54 (kilograms of CO2 per 1$ of GDP (PPP)) in 1990, to 0.50 in 2000
and 0.47 in 2007, world’s emissions of CO2 increased from 21,899 millions of metric tons in 1990
to 24,043 in 2000 and 29,595 in 2007 (see The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010 (United
Nations)).
The results of this paper should not be interpreted as supporting the use of dirtier technologies.
The main policy recommendation is that the efforts of discovering and using clean technologies
should not be viewed as a substitute for the need to succeed in a multilateral coordination of
emissions.
The effort of creating clean technologies and the effort of coordinating the control over emissions
should be pursued jointly. Intuition would suggest that the potential negative impact of clean tech-
nologies would not take place if the adoption of a clean technology were accompanied with a well
designed limit over emissions. Although this is intuitive, this idea deserves to be carefully studied since
the impact of quotas in dynamic games are far from trivial (see, e.g., Dockner and Haug, 1990, 1991),
as is the impact of cleaner technologies on the size of stable international environmental agreements
and the level of emissions control that can be self-enforced in such agreements (see Benchekroun and
Ray Chaudhuri, 2013).
Our analysis shows that the international cooperation over emissions control is not only needed
as an incentive to induce R&D and innovation, but is also necessary to ensure that the development of
cleaner technologies does not exacerbate the free riding behavior that is at the origin of the climate
change problem. We  have considered the impact of an exogenous change in the emissions per output
ratio. The results of this paper suggest that the analysis of a model that embeds this framework and
where investment in R&D to reduce emissions per output is taken into account, can be a promising
line of future research.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
We  use the undetermined coefﬁcient technique (see Dockner et al. (2000), Chapter 4) to derive the
linear Markov perfect equilibrium. The details are omitted. (See Proposition 1 of Dockner and Long
(1993) for the case where  = 1) 
Appendix B. Derivation of (14)
In order to prove Proposition 2, it will be useful to rewrite the equilibrium production strategy as
Q (P; ) = 1
2n − 1
((
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r
)
A − 1

 − 2k − r
2
P
)
(14)
where
 ≡
√
(2k  + r)2 + (2n  − 1)4s2.
The equilibrium production strategy is
Q = A − An˛
2
k + r + (2n  − 1)˛2 −
˛2

P (15)
where
2  ˛ = −2k − r +
√
(2k  + r)2 + (2n  − 1)4s2
2(2n − 1)
Thus,
˛2 =  − 2k − r
2(2n − 1) . (16)
Substituting (16) into the equilibrium production strategy and simplifying gives (14).
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
We  now evaluate dPSS/d. The steady state is determined as the solution to
A
n − 1
2n − 1 + 2A
n
(2n  − 1)
k + r
 + r =
(
k
n
+ 1

 − 2k − r
2(2n − 1)
)
P (17)
which after simpliﬁcation yields
A
(
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r
)
 =
(
n − nr + 2k(n − 1)
2n
)
P (18)
Taking the derivative with respect to  and multiplying each side by (n − nr + 2k(n − 1))/2n and using
(18) gives
A
(
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r
)(
n − nr + 2k(n − 1)
2n
)
+A
(
−2n k + r
( + r)2
)  (
n − nr + 2k(n − 1)
2n
)

= 1
2
A
(
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r
)
 +
(
n − nr + 2k(n − 1)
2n
)2
P
(19)
where P ≡ dPSS/d.
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Using the fact that
 =
2 − (2k  + r)2

=  − (2k + r)
2

(20)
gives (
n − nr + 2k(n − 1)
2n
)2
P
= A
(
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r
)(
n − nr + 2k(n − 1)
2n
)
+
A
(
−2n k + r
( + r)2
n − nr + 2k(n − 1)
2n
− 1
2
(
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r
))
2 − (2k  + r)2

When → ∞,  we have
lim
→∞
⎛
⎜⎝
A
(
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r
)(
n − nr + 2k(n − 1)
2n
)
+A
(
−2n k + r
( + r)2
n − nr + 2k(n − 1)
2n
− 1
2
(
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r
))
2 − (2k  + r)2

⎞
⎟⎠
= − 1
2
A
2k(2n − 1) + (3n  − 1)nr
n
< 0
(21)
Given the deﬁnition of ,  we have the following:
lim
s→∞
dPSS
d
< 0, lim
k→∞
dPSS
d
< 0, lim
r→∞
dPSS
d
< 0, lim
n→∞
dPSS
d
< 0
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 3
We  have
E(P; ) =
1
2n − 1
(
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r − 2n
k + r
( + r)2

)
A − 1
2n − 1

2
P
From (20), we have that
E(P; ) = E(0; ) −
1
2n − 1
1
2
(
 − (2k + r)
2

)
P
with
E(0; ) =
1
2n − 1
(
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r − 2n
k + r
( + r)2
(
 − (2k + r)
2

))
A.
Thus, we have
E(P; ) < 0
iff
2(2n − 1)E(0; )
 − ((2k + r)2/)
= P˜ < P.
After simpliﬁcation of E(0 ; ) we have
E(0; ) =
1
2n − 1
(
n − 1 + 2nr (k + r)
( + r)2
(
1 + (2k + r)
2
r
))
A > 0 (22)
It follows that P˜ > 0.
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We  now compare P˜ to P. We  have
P = 2(n − 1 + 2n((k + r)/( + r)))A
 − 2k − r
and thus
P˜
P
= 2(2n − 1)E(0; )
 − ((2k + r)2/)
  − 2k − r
2(n − 1 + 2n((k + r)/( + r)))A
or
P˜
P
= 
( + 2k + r)
(2n − 1)E(0; )
(n − 1 + 2n((k + r)/( + r)))A .
After simpliﬁcation and substitution of E(0 ; ) we have
(2n  − 1)E(0; )
(n − 1 + 2n((k + r)/( + r))A
= (n − 1 + 2n((k + r)/( + r)) − 2n((k + r)/(( + r)
2))( − ((2k + r)2)/)
n − 1 + 2n((k + r)/( + r))
or
(2n  − 1)E(0; )
(n − 1 + 2n((k + r)/( + r))A = 1 −
2n(k + r)/( + r)2( − ((2k + r)2/))
n − 1 + 2n((k + r)/( + r)) < 1
implying
P˜
P
< 1
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4: Main Proposition
For an analytical analysis of the sign of W |P=PSS() rewrite
rW |P=PSS() = (n − 1)WPQ + nQWP
as
rW |P=PSS() =
(
Q
Q
+ n
n − 1
)
(n − 1)QWP (23)
Recall that the equilibrium production strategy is given by
Q = 1
2n − 1
((
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r
)
A − 1

 − 2k − r
2
P
)
(24)
Taking the derivative of Q with respect to  gives
Q = −2A
n
(2n  − 1)
k + r
( + r)2
 +
1
2
 − 2k − r
2(2n − 1) P −
1


2(2n − 1)P (25)
Evaluating QQ at the steady state (that is, at P = P
SS), where Q = kPSS/n, gives
Q
Q
=  −2A n
(2n  − 1)
k + r
( + r)2

n
kPSS
+ 1

n
2(2n − 1)k ( − 2k − r − ) (26)
which after using (20) and the fact that
lim
s→∞
 = ∞ (27)
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gives
lim
s→∞
(
1

n
2(2n − 1)k ( − 2k − r − )
)
= 1

n
2(2n − 1)k (−2k  − r)
and, therefore,
lim
s→∞
(
Q
Q
)
= lim
s→∞
(
−2A n
(2n  − 1)
k + r
( + r)2

n2
kPSS
)
− n
2(2n − 1)k (2k  + r) (28)
To determine the above limit it is convenient to write the steady state stock of pollution as a function
 instead of s. The steady state stock of pollution is the solution to (18), which can be rewritten as
A
(
n − 1 + 2n k + r
 + r
)
 =
(
1
2
− nr − 2k(n − 1)
2n
)
P (29)
or,
P  = A(n − 1 + 2n((k + r)/( + r)))
(1/2) − (nr − 2k(n − 1))/2n (30)
Therefore, we have
lim
→∞
P  = 2A(n − 1).
From (27), we have the following:
lim
s→∞
PSS = 2(n − 1)A (31)
Rewriting (28) as
lim
s→∞
(
Q
Q
)
= lim
s→∞
(
−2A n
(2n  − 1) (k + r)
n
k
2
( + r)2


1
PSS
)
− n
2(2n − 1)k (2k  + r)
and using (27), (31) and (20) gives
lim
s→∞
(
Q
Q
)
= −2A n
(2n  − 1) (k + r)
n
k
1
2(n − 1)A −
n
2(2n − 1)k (2k + r)
or,
lim
s→∞
(
Q
Q
)
= 1
2k
n(2k + r − 4kn − 3nr)
2n2 − 3n + 1
This implies that
lim
s→∞
(
Q
Q
+ n
n − 1
)
= − nr
2k
3n − 1
(n − 1)(2n − 1) < 0 (32)
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